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The reported plot by
certain “elements of the Iranian government” to kill Saudi
Arabia’s ambassador to the U.S. raises several crucial
questions.[1] Did the alleged elements follow orders from
the higher-ups or did they create the plot by themselves?
What might be the motivations for the killing of the Saudi
ambassador on American soil? Why would a government with a
long history of assassinations and terrorist attacks around the
world utilize the bizarre method of using a Mexican drug cartel?
And what are the ramifications of this event?
Who
Ordered the Plot?
From what is known about the
decision-making in regards to assassinations abroad, all such
decisions are made by the highest officials and require the final
approval of the Supreme Leader. The Iranian government has
carried out large numbers of assassinations abroad. Many
agents of the Iranian government have been arrested, tried, and
convicted by various courts in Europe. In one major trial in
Berlin, known as the Mykonos trial, the German court prosecuted
one Iranian and four Lebanese Shias for the assassinations of four
Iranian dissidents. The court heard from Bani Sadr, the
first President after the revolution, and Abolghassem Mesbahi, a
former high-ranking official of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence.
Bani Sadr and Mesbahi explained to the court how decisions on the
assassinations abroad are made.
According to Bani Sadr and
Mesbahi, such decisions are made by the “Committee for Special
Operations.” The members of this committee are the Supreme
Leader, the President, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of
Intelligence.[2] Whom to be assassinated and how the
operation should be conducted are carefully vetted. The
decision is made collectively and has to have the support of the
Supreme Leader. The execution of the plan is carried out by
the Minister of Intelligence, who usually uses special forces from
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and
the Ministry of Intelligence. The German court ruled that
the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Foreign Minister had
ordered the assassinations and issued arrest warrants for the
Minister of Intelligence for organizing the assassinations.
A decision was made by Iran’s leaders in 1997 to stop the
assassinations abroad. Between 1998 and 2005, no such
assassinations occurred. Earlier, the Iranian government was
involved in major terrorist plots against Americans and Jews.
For example, the FBI officially blamed the Saudi Hezbollah for the
bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia which killed 19
American military personnel on June 25, 1996. The Saudi
Hezbollah is closely related to the Iranian government.[3]
It is also believed that an Iranian proxy, the Lebanese Hezbollah,
carried out the attacks on a Jewish center in Buenos Aires on July
18, 1994, which killed 85 people.
Such assassinations seem
to have re-started in 2005. On February 14, 2005, a massive
car bomb in Beirut killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and
22 other people. An international court has indicted four
members of Hezbollah. WikiLeaks revealed that the Iranian
government agents had plans to kill dissidents in southern
California and London.[4]
The Iranian government publicly
denies that the arrested assassins have been working for it,
despite solid evidence to the contrary. However, the Iranian
government has engaged in swaps of these convicted assassins with
Westerners held hostage in Lebanon or imprisoned in Iran.
The Quds Force and the IRGC do not answer to the President; they
only answer to the Supreme Leader. According to the U.S.
government allegations, high-level officials of the QF were behind
the plot. The Quds Force would not make such decisions by
itself. All such decisions have to be approved by the
Supreme Leader.
Why the Saudi Ambassador to the
U.S.?
But why would Iran’s leaders want to
assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States on
American soil when they could more easily kill Saudi officials in
Lebanon and other places around the world? I see three main
reasons. First and foremost, by carrying out assassinations
in Washington, the Iranian government shows its reach. That
mentality was clearly shown when Iranian leaders stated that they
will send Iranian navy ships close to American shores.
Iran’s leaders want to be the hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf
and the greater Middle East region. They regard the American
forces in the region as the primary obstacle to their ambition.
The assassinations of several Iranian scientists have caused
Iran’s leaders to want to retaliate in order to show that
Washington can be as unsafe as Tehran.
Second, Ambassador
Adel Al-Jubeir is a central figure in the minds of Iranian
leaders. He is not only the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., he
is also a top foreign policy advisor to King Abdallah.
Moreover, he is considered to be personally very close to the
King. Al-Jubeir is the connection between Iran’s two main
foes, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. According to the WikiLeaks,
Ambassador Al-Jubeir told the Americans that King Abdallah had
repeatedly urged the United States to attack Iran to destroy
Iran’s nuclear facilities and to counter Iran’s influence in Iraq.
Al-Jubeir paraphrased the King urging the Americans to “cut off
the head of the snake,” referring to attacking Iran’s
leadership.[5] The Iranian forces could not kill King
Abdallah, but the assassination of Ambassador Al-Jubeir was the
closest they could achieve.
Third, Iran and Saudi Arabia
have been engaged in a bloody struggle since 1979. The
eight-year war between Iran and Iraq was in some measure a war by
the Arab Sunni powers to counter Ayatollah Khomeini’s call for the
export of the revolution via the Muslim masses (and Shia in
particular) to rise up and overthrow the status quo powers in the
region. The Saudi government assisted Iraq in the 1980-88
war with Iran. The Iranian government has tried to
destabilize not only Saudi Arabia, but also other countries
closely allied with Saudi Arabia such as Kuwait and Bahrain.
There has been a proxy war going on in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon
between the two regional powers, with Iran supporting Shia groups
(Maliki government in Iraq, Bashar al Assad in Syria, and
Hezbollah in Lebanon) and Saudi Arabia primarily supporting Sunni
groups (those opposed to Maliki in Iraq, the opposition in Syria,
and a moderate Sunni group associated with former Prime Minister
Saad Hariri in Lebanon). This struggle became hot in 2011
when Saudi military forces entered Bahrain to put down an uprising
of the Shias against the closely-allied Sunni king there.[6]
Saudi intelligence officials allege that Iranian agents were
involved in the assassination of a Saudi diplomat in Karachi,
Pakistan on May 16, 2011.[7] The Pakistani intelligence has
identified the assassin as a member of Sapih Mohammad, a Shia
militant group with connections to the Quds Force.
The
Obama administration’s policies in the region are interpreted by
both the Iranian and Saudi governments as unprecedented American
weakness. The Obama administration did not do anything to
help Ayad Allawi (a moderate, pro-U.S. secular Shia with close
alliances with the Sunnis), who received the highest number of
votes and could have formed a government while the Iranian
government went full throttle to pressure Kurdish parties and
other groups to form a coalition with Maliki. In Lebanon,
the Obama administration’s hands-off policy caused several parties
to leave Saad Hariri’s moderate pro-U.S. government and side with
the coalition supported by Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy. The
public complaints by top American military officials about the
killings of American military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan by
Iran’s proxies and the utter lack of retaliation by the Obama
administration is perceived as President Obama’s determination to
leave the region as soon as possible regardless of Iran’s behavior
or political ramifications.
Iran’s fundamentalist rulers
believe in revenge and violence. In all likelihood, the
Supreme Leader wished to humiliate President Obama, inflict great
and public pain on the Saudis, and claim that it had nothing to do
with the assassination. In the past few years, Iran has
witnessed the assassination of its close ally and Hezbollah
terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyah as well as several of Iran’s
nuclear scientists. Those assassinations humiliated the
Supreme Leader, inflicted great pain, and no one has publicly
claimed responsibility. The plot to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador would have been retaliation for the assassinations of
Iranian nuclear scientists, the Saudi military intervention in
Bahrain, and the Saudi urging of the U.S. to militarily attack
Iran. This operation, if successful, would have been a great
defeat for the United States and Saudi Arabia with no costs to
Iran.
Why Use Los Zetas?
Why would
Iran use the bizarre method of using a Mexican drug cartel instead
of Iranian agents or Lebanese Hezbollah cells? It is widely
suspected that Iran possesses a large number of agents as well as
Lebanese Hezbollah sleeper cells in the United States. To
what extent the American intelligence and law enforcement agencies
have identified all such individuals cannot be known.
Americans only know those they have identified; they do not know
which cells they have not identified. The Iranian government
suspects that some of its assets have been compromised, but could
not be sure which ones have or have not been compromised. In
all likelihood, they could best be used to carry out terrorist
activities if a war breaks out (or is about to break out) between
the U.S. and Iran. Any utilization of Iran’s assets in the
U.S. for the alleged plot against the Saudi ambassador may lead to
their discovery by American law enforcement and thus neutralize
many of them for a far more significant confrontation. The
use of the Mexican drug cartel is a very cheap way to accomplish
this particular assassination, and would also greatly reduce the
likelihood of finding Iran’s fingerprints on the assassination.
Had the person Mr. Manssor Arbabsiar contacted not been an
undercover agent, one may not have found out who carried out the
terrorist attacks in Washington. A combination of great
luck, Mr. Arbabsiar’s lack of sophistication, and expenditure on
counter-narcotic activities by the DEA undermined this plot.[8]
The particular choice of Los Zetas was due to Mr. Arbabsiar’s
connections. Arbabsiar lived in Corpus Christi, Texas.
According to U.S. accounts, Arbabsiar believed that the nephew of
a female friend was a member of Los Zetas. The nephew,
however, happened to be the DEA informant.[9] Arbabsiar’s
cousin is Abdul Reza Shahlai, the notorious Quds Force senior
commander, who is the mastermind of the killings of five American
military personnel in Iraq in a brazen attack in 2007.[10]
Consequences
If the allegation proves to
be true, we have crossed the Rubicon. This is not a crisis
that the Obama administration wanted. The Obama
administration wished to concentrate on domestic economic issues.
President Obama began the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq,
and wants to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan as soon as
possible. The Obama administration did not wish to
complicate the matters with Iran.
Considering that the plot
is essentially an act of war, it remains to be seen what the Obama
administration’s response will be. President Obama was
informed about the plot in June 2011. Arbabsiar was arrested
on September 29. The government made the announcement on
October 11. So the Obama administration had a significant
amount of time to plan a response. It appears that the Obama
administration wishes to use the foiled assassination plot to
increase pressure on the Islamic Republic.
The Department
of the Treasury announced that it has placed Arbabsiar and four
IRGC-QF officials on its sanctions list. The Treasury press
release stated: “As a result of today’s designation, U.S. persons
are prohibited from engaging in transactions with these
individuals, and any assets they may hold in the U.S. are
frozen.”[11] The U.S. Department of the Treasury also
sanctioned Mahan Air, a private airline in Iran for its role in
the assassination plot.[12] The U.S. also has publicly asked
the UN International Atomic Energy Agency to release its documents
and finding on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.[13] The
latest IAEA report indicated that the agency had serious concerns
about Iran’s nuclear weapons program.[14]
More
significantly, the Obama administration announced that it would
take the case to the UN Security Council. The Obama
administration’s decision to go to the UN Security Council would
be a wise move if the U.S. could garner the support of other
powers, especially Russia and China for fully banning the purchase
of Iranian oil. The only sanction which could put real
pressure on Iran’s leaders is a full boycott on the sale of
Iranian oil. Pursuing some sanctions on a few Quds Force
officers or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will have no
real effect on Iran. Such minor sanctions will consolidate
the perception of American weakness in the region.
If the
U.S. failed in gaining support from other powers for sanctions in
the form of a full banning of Iranian oil, Obama would have two
real options: a military confrontation with Iran or sit back and
watch a military confrontation between Sunni powers and Iran in
the region. If the Obama administration were to respond
strongly (e.g., call for the replacement of the current regime
with democracy, boycott of oil purchases from the regime, military
strikes), then we will observe a serious escalation in the
U.S.-Iran confrontation. However, the Obama administration
seems to be only hoping to impose some mild sanctions and to
further isolate the Islamic Republic. If the Obama
administration does not respond strongly, that will show to the
people of the Middle East the utter collapse of American might,
which would encourage and galvanize Iran and its proxies to make
further violent attacks on the U.S. and its allies. If the
U.S. does not respond strongly, a serious confrontation between
Iran and Saudi Arabia is the likely outcome with the very high
likelihood of a regional conflagration. If Saudi Arabia does
not use a strong response either, that would clearly show to
Iran’s leaders that they could pursue other bellicose policies
without concern for retaliation.
The Iranian plot
vindicates the analysis of those who have argued that no amount of
concessions would change the behavior of the Iranian government.
With a diplomatic failure at the UN Security Council, the
Republican presidential candidates could point to President
Obama’s naďve faith in stretching his hand of friendship to Iran’s
Supreme Leader, as well as his weakness in confronting Iran’s
terrorist activities and the putative nuclear weapons program.[15]
Iran’s Supreme Leader has greatly undermined the American
president’s chances for reelection. By doing so, Khamenei
greatly increased the likelihood of war. In all likelihood,
a Republican president would use American military might for
regime change if Obama were to lose the next election.
*Masoud Kazemzadeh is associate professor of
political science at Sam Houston State University.
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Notes:
[1] No author
cited, “Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi
Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” FBI, October 11, 2011,
http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/two-men-charged-in-alleged-plot-to-assassinate-saudi-arabian-ambassador-to-the-united-states
(accessed October 11, 2011); and the complaint filed with the
Southern District of New York, October 11, 2011,
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/255899/federal-charges-against-arbabsiar-manssor-and.pdf
(accessed October 11, 2011). CNN Wire Staff, “Iranian Plot
to Kill Saudi Ambassador Thwarted, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN,
October 12, 2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/11/justice/iran-saudi-plot/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
(accessed October 11-12, 2011 on the continuing story).
[2]
No author cited, “Iran: ‘Mykonos’ Trial Provides Further Evidence
of Iranian Policy of Unlawful State Killings,” Amnesty
International, AI Index MDE 13/15/97, April 10, 1997,
http://www.iranrights.org/english/document-355.php (accessed
October 12, 2011).
[3] No author cited, “Khobar
Towers Press Release,” FBI, Department of Justice, June 21, 2001,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/khobar_fbi.htm
(accessed October 14, 2011).
[4] Drew Griffin and
David Fitzpatrick, “CNN Exclusive: Plotter of Foiled ‘Hit’ Was
Allowed to Return to Iran,” CNN, February 21, 2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/02/04/siu.calif.iran.hit.foiled/index.html
(accessed October 15, 2011).
[5] No author cited, “US
embassy cables: Saudi king urges US strike on Iran,” WikiLeaks,
published in The Guardian of London,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran?intcmp=239
(accessed December 20, 2010). The original document is dated
April 20, 2008. The Guardian published it on November 28,
2010.
[6] Mitchell A. Belfer, “Iran’s Bahraini
Ambitions,” The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204612504576608852457881450.html
(accessed October 8, 2011).
[7] David Ignatius,
“Intelligence Links Iran to Saudi Diplomat’s Murder,” The
Washington Post blog, October 13, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/intelligence-links-iran-to-saudi-diplomats-murder/2011/10/13/gIQAFzCPiL_blog.html
(accessed October 15, 2011).
[8] On Arbabsiar’s lack
of sophistication see Rick Spruill, “Terror Suspect’s Friends:
Mansour Arbabsiar Likely Involved in Plot for Money,” Corpus
Christi Caller, October 11, 2011,
http://m.caller.com/news/2011/oct/11/terror-suspects-friends-arbabsiar-likely-involved/
(accessed October 11, 2011).
[9] Peter Finn,
“Notorious Iranian Militant Has a Connection to Alleged
Assassination Plot Against Saudi Envoy,” The Washington Post,
October 14, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/notorious-iranian-militant-has-a-connection-to-alleged-assassination-plot-against-saudi-envoy/2011/10/14/gIQAJ3E6kL_story.html
(accessed October 15, 2011).
[10] Ibid.
[11]
No author cited, “Treasury Sanctions Five Individuals Tied to
Iranian Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the
United States,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 11, 2011,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1320.aspx
(accessed October 15, 2011).
[12] No author cited,
“US treasury imposes sanctions on Iran’s Mahan Air,” BBC News,
October 12, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-us-canada-15281536
(accessed October 15, 2011).
[13] David E. Sanger and
Mark Landler, “To Isolate Iran, U.S. Presses Inspectors on Nuclear
Data,” The New York Times, October 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/world/middleeast/white-house-says-data-shows-iran-push-on-nuclear-arms.html?ref=nuclearprogram
(accessed October 16, 2011).
[14] Report by the
Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the
Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2011/54,
September 2, 2011,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-54.pdf
(accessed September 20, 2011).
[15] Michael Crowley,
“What the Alleged Iran Assassination Plot Means for 2012,” Time
Magazine, October 17, 2011,
http://swampland.time.com/2011/10/17/what-the-alleged-iran-assassination-plot-means-for-the-2012-election/
(accessed October 17, 2011).
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